Working Paper
Workers' Beliefs and Reputation Acquisition in Online Labor Markets
with Hamna Ahmed and Zunia Saif Tirmazee
Abstract: Hundreds of millions of workers in developing countries seek digital jobs on online freelancing platforms, but many struggle to secure jobs without established reputations. Classic reputation models predict that novice workers can build a reputation by offering low wages initially, yet few do. Workers may refrain because they believe employers interpret low prices as low quality or are uncertain about their ability to generate good ratings. We study these explanations using two field experiments on the world's largest freelancing platform. The demand-side experiment shows that low wage offers raise reviews and callbacks more for novices than for veterans, contrary to workers' pessimistic beliefs. In the supply-side experiment, providing information about employer responses and workers' own performance increases novices' likelihood of offering low wages. Consistent with the models, effects are driven by high-ability novices when informed about their own performance. These findings suggest that online platforms can accelerate talent discovery through information interventions that correct novices' beliefs.
Intra-Household Incentive Design: An Experiment on Parent-Child Decision Dynamics in Pakistan (Draft Available Upon Request)
with Hamna Ahmed, Zunia Saif Tirmazee, and Emma Zhang
Coverage: Chicago Booth Review
Abstract: How should we design and target incentives for skills investment in young adults who live with their parents? We study the role of intra-household payment and information targeting on the effectiveness of a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program using a randomized control trial. The program aimed to boost completion of a digital skills training program among young females in urban Pakistan. Fixing the incentive size and daughters’ knowledge about it, we cross-randomized (1) the payment split between parents and daughters and (2) whether parents received information about the daughters’ incentive. Under asymmetric information about the CCT, incentivizing parents increased training completion by 103% compared to incentivizing daughters, driven by increased parental nudging. When both parents and daughters knew about the CCT, completion rates did not vary by the incentive split. Two-year follow-up reveals that young women who completed the training programs are more likely to be working and demonstrate more extensive computer use. Our results suggest that in this parent-child context, incomplete information sharing is the main barrier to the optimal incentive targeting for skill acquisition.
Work in Progress
Intermediation by Superstars: Evidence from Online Labor Markets - Pilot completed